Australian Fathers

Rffj this morning sent 2 activists units to the Nottingham and Kennington homes of Justice Secretary Ken Clarke. This morning two members have taken to the rooftop of the West Bridgford Conservative Club directly opposite Ken Clarke’s offices.
The purpose is to bring Ken Clarke into the real world, and decontaminate his ‘Victorian dad’ style of thinking.
Ahead of the demonstration, news filtered in to protesters about the passing of Paul Pegram, a loving father who had recently taken his own life after a judge had permanently excluded him from contact with his 7 year old son.
Rffj said “We will observe a minute silence today to pay our respects to Paul Pegram, a loving father who lost his life because he was failed by family law”
“The system failed in their duty of care to Paul and his son, he was told he wouldn’t even be allowed to phone his son again, let alone have any direct contact with him” “We are here today to bring Ken Clarke into the real world, to let him know what actually happens behind the secret doors of a family court, how it ruins lives like Paul Pegram and his son”

http://whatblackmenthink.com/

About Children’s Rights

Donations Go To

WEBSITE: ExposingTheRecord.org

If you would be interested in joining the Australian Non-Custodial Parents (Equal Parenting) party, would you please fill in the attached membership form.

Membership is free (as usual).

Our web-site is: http://www.equalparenting.org.au/ and our membership form can be downloaded from: http://www.equalparenting.org.au/membership-2/

Could you either then: 1. Scan the signed copy of the membership form and email it to me

or 2. Fax a signed copy to me on (02) 4226 3510.

or 3. Mail a signed copy to me at PO Box 57, THIRROUL. NSW. 2515.

As noted above, membership is free. Other family members and friends may be also interested in joining the Party.

The Non-Custodial Parents Party (Equal Parenting) was formed in Australia in 1998. We are registered with the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) as a political party.

Our Party has a large membership base. It consists of divorced fathers, divorced mothers, second wives, grand parents and other relatives and friends who believe that all children have a right to be cared for by both their parents, in the event of separation or divorce.

Neither gender nor the type of gender relationship are an issue to our party. What is most important is the children and the relationship of both parents with the children. Membership is open to everyone.

Founding Fathers March Taking Shape
http://www.leonkoziol.com

http://www.causes.com/causes/409526-children-s-rights/actions/1596154

Research on Babies and Toddlers Contact with Fathers.
Even Toddlers Need Fathers. Kingsley Miller

WHEN GOVERMENT IGNORES YOU WHEN RIGHTS ARE BREACHED WHEN THE LAW FAILS WHEN DIPLOMACY HITS A WALL YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEFEND YOUR SELF AND YOU’RE FAMILY.

DADS CARE TOO IS GROWING TO HELP SUPPORT PARENTS WORLDWIDE AND FIGHT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS OF ALL PARENTS

David MoyeContributor

Any guy who gives flowers on Feb. 14 is a blooming idiot.

So says Marc Rudov, a relationship expert in Los Gatos, Calif., who is on a campaign to get American men to boycott Valentine’s Day.

According to Rudov, who has authored books such as “Under the Clitoral Hood: How to Crank Her Engine Without Cash, Booze or Jumper Cables,” believes Valentine’s Day should be canceled permanently because it promotes unequality of the sexes.

Marc H. Rudov

Marc Rudov believes that true equality between the sexes will never happen as long as women force men to spend lots of money on them each Valentine’s Day.

“There’s nothing romantic about coercing men to oblige female entitlement,” Rudov said. “Valentine’s Day artificially and unilaterally caters to women. It’s the media’s annual male-bashing fest.”

Rudov believes the holiday is better named “Nomance Day” and says he expects all “real men” to boycott it.

This is the fifth year that Rudov has declared his boycott, and he admits it’s been an uphill battle.

“Have I made a dent?” Rudov rhetorically asked AOL News. “Absolutely not! That’s because men are wimps and they do what their women want. Guys [celebrate Valentine’s Day] because they’re afraid they’ll get rejected in the bedroom.”

Rudov admits he too once fell for the “sextortion,” but changed for the better about 10 years ago.

“I asked myself, ‘Why am I doing this? It’s stupid,’ ” he said. “And it is, but you know what? Most people follow the herd.”

Part of Rudov’s complaint is that V-day is an example of “expected generosity,” a term he points out “is both oxymoronic and moronic.”

“Valentine’s Day is a romantic implant,” he griped. “It’s fake.”

It also violates Rudov’s sense of fairness.

Courtesy DeAnna Lorraine

Matchmaker DeAnna Lorraine predicts the proposed Valentine’s Day boycott will fail because women won’t stand for it.

“In the upcoming Super Bowl, there won’t be one commercial urging women to buy gifts for men. In fact, Faith Hill will appear in an emasculating Teleflora spot to condescendingly help a hapless sound technician shop for his girlfriend,” he said.

“Any man who buckles to society’s pressure to buy her overpriced flowers or jewelry or meals on Feb. 14 is a eunuch desperate for sex, and he needs to grow a pair.

“A guy is pressured to shell out dough on Valentine’s Day because he doesn’t want to be singled out as a cheap bastard, but is a woman cheap if she doesn’t buy gifts?”

Rudov claims he once did an experiment designed to prove his point: He went into a Hallmark card store asking for the section for “apology cards for women to give to men.”

“The women there practically laughed me out of the store,” he said. “They said, ‘Women don’t apologize to men.’ Then I went to a florist and asked how many women bought flowers for men. The florist told me, ‘Women don’t buy flowers for men.’ ”

But Rudov is quick to point out that celebrating Valentine’s Day is just a bad deal all the way around.

“Even if women are told they also have to buy stuff on that day, it’s still a fake holiday,” he said.

For the record, Rudov may prefer to be heartless on Valentine’s Day, but he isn’t completely heartless himself.

“If a man wants to give a woman flowers, he should, but it shouldn’t be mandated on a specific day,” he said, adding that he does have a girlfriend despite his unorthodox beliefs.

“One of the reasons she likes me is that I have a pair and can stand up to her — and to society’s nonsense,” he said.

The key, he says, is to be up front about your anti-V-day beliefs right from the git-go.

As you might expect, Rudov’s boycott isn’t exactly getting support from fellow relationship experts like San Diego matchmaker DeAnna Lorraine.

“No woman is going to put up with this boycott,” Lorraine said. “It’s more about love and the expression of love. And it’s not just about the woman. It’s one-sided to think that it’s just about the men.”

Still, she agrees that a guy should be able to buy cards and flowers for his lady any time he wants, but suggests he do it between now and Valentine’s Day because it will make it easier for her to explain to her friends why he doesn’t buy those things on Feb. 14.

Rudov realizes that his boycott may not make a financial dent in the coffers of card companies and candy-makers, but that’s OK, since he measures success in a different way.

“I will consider it a success if it convinces a guy to say, ‘I did it! I finally grew up and grew a pair and I found a woman who agrees with me!’ ”

http://www.aolnews.com/2011/02/04/male-rights-activist-boycotts-the-nomance-of-valentines-day/

February 4, 2012Dr. Murray StrausFeminism, Feminist Lies

[editor’s note: This paper is gratefully reprinted with permission from Dr. Murray Straus. It was originally posted online on July 14, 2007]

Processes Explaining the Concealment and Distortion of Evidence on Gender Symmetry in Partner Violence

Graham-Kevan’s paper fully documents overwhelming evidence that the “patriarchal dominance” theory of partner violence (PV from here on) explains only a small part of PV. Moreover, more such evidence is rapidly emerging. To take just one recent example, analyses of data from 32 nations in the International Dating Violence Study (Straus, 2007) Straus and International Dating Violence Research Consortium 2004) found about equal perpetration rates and a predominance of mutual violence in all 32 samples, including non-western nations.

Moreover, data from that study also show that, within a couples relationship, domination and control by women occurs as often as by men and are as strongly associated with perpetration of PV by women as by men (Straus 2007) Graham- Kevan also documents the absence of evidence indicating that the patriarchal dominance approach to prevention and treatment has been effective. In my opinion, it would be even more appropriate to say that what success has been achieved in preventing and treating PV has been achieved despite the handicaps imposed by focusing exclusively on eliminating male-dominance and misogyny, important as that is as an end in itself.

Graham-Kevan’s paper raises the question of how an explanatory theory and treatment modality could have persisted for 30 years and still persists, despite hundreds of studies which provide evidence that PV has many causes, not just male-dominance. The answer is that it emerged from a convergence of a number of different historical and social factors. One of these is that gender symmetry in perpetration of partner violence is inconsistent with male predominance in almost all other crimes, especially violent crimes. Another is the greater injury rate suffered by female victims of PV brings female victimization to public attention much more often.

Although there are many causes of the persistence of the patriarchal dominance focus, I believe that the predominant cause has been the efforts of feminists to conceal, deny, and distort the evidence. Moreover, these efforts include intimidation and threats, and have been carried out not only by feminist advocates and service providers, but also by feminist researchers who have let their ideological commitments overrule their scientific commitments.

At the same time, it is important to recognize the tremendous contribution to human relationships and crime control made by feminist efforts to end violence against women. This effort has brought public attention the fact that PV may be the most prevalent fom1 of interpersonal violence, created a world~wide detem1ination to cease ignoring PV, and take steps to combat PV. It has brought the rule of law to one of the last spheres of life where ‘self-help’ justice (Black 1983) prevails by changing the legal status of domestic assaults, by changing police and court practices from one of ignoring and minimization PV to one of compelling the criminal justice system to attend and intervene.

In addition, feminists have created two important new social institutions: shelters for battered women and treatment programs for male perpetrators. However, the exclusive focus on male perpetrators and the exclusive focus on just one of the many causes has stymied this extension of the rule of law and the effort to end domestic violence. Ironically, it has also handicapped eff0rts to protect women from PV and end PV by men (Feld and Straus 1989; Medeiros and Straus 2006; Straus 2007; Straus and Scott, in press). Consequently, information on how this could have occurred can be helpful in bringing about a change. This commentary identifies seven of the methods.

Methods Used to Conceal and Distort Evidence on Symmetry in Partner Violence

Method 1. Suppress Evidence

Researchers who have an ideological commitment to the idea that men are almost always the sole perpetrator often conceal evidence that contradicts this belief. Among researchers not committed to that ideology, many (including me and some of my colleagues) have withheld results showing gender symmetry to avoid becoming victims of vitriolic denunciations and ostracism (see Method 7 below). Thus, many researchers have published only the data on male perpetrators or female victims, deliberately omitting data on female perpetrators and male victims.

This practice started with one of the first general population surveys on family violence. The survey done for the Kentucky Commission on the Status of Women obtained data on both men and women, but only the data on male perpetration was published (Schulman 1979). Among the many other examples of respected researchers publishing only the data on assaults by men are Kennedy and Dutton (1989); Lackey and Williams (1995); Johnson and Leone (2005); and Kaufman Kantor and Straus (1987).

Method 2. Avoid Obtaining Data Inconsistent with the Patriarchal Dominance Theory

In survey research, this method of concealment asks female participants about attacks by their male partners and avoids asking them if they had hit their male partner. The Canadian Violence against Women survey (Johnson and Sacco 1995), for example, used what can be called a feminist version of the Conflict Tactics Scales to measure PY. This version omitted the questions on perpetration by the female participants in the study. For the US National Violence against Women Survey (Tjaden and Thoennes 2000), the US Department of Justice originally planned the same strategy. Fortunately, the US Centers for Disease Control added a sample of men to the project. But when Johnson and Leone (Johnson and Leone 2005) investigated the prevalence of “intimate terrorists” among the participants in that study, they guaranteed there would be no female intimate terrorists by using only the data on male perpetrators.

For a lecture in Montreal, I examined 12 Canadian studies. Ten of the 12 reported only assaults by men. The most recent example occurred in the spring of 2006 when a colleague approached the director of a university survey center about conducting a survey of partner violence if a recently submitted grant was awarded. A faculty member at that university objected to including questions on female perpetration, and the center director said he was not likely to do the survey if the funds were awarded.

Method 3. Cite Only Studies That Show Male Perpetration

I could list a large number of journal articles showing selective citation, but instead I will illustrate the process with official document examples to show that this method of concealment and distortion is institutionalized in publications of governments, the United Nations, and the World Health Organization. For example, US Dept. of Justice publications almost always cite only the National Crime Victimization study, which shows male predominance (Durose et al. 2005). They ignore the Department of Justice published critiques, which led to a revision of the survey to correct that bias. However, the revision was only partly successful (Straus 1999), yet they continue to cite it and ignore other more accurate studies they have sponsored which show gender symmetry.

After delaying release of the results of the National Violence against Women for almost two years, the press releases issued by the Department of Justice provided only the “life- time prevalence” data and ignored the “past-year prevalence” data, because the lifetime data showed predominantly male perpetration, whereas the more accurate past-year data showed that women perpetrated 40% of the partner assaults.

The widely acclaimed and influential World Health Organization report on domestic violence (Krug et al. 2002) reports that “Where violence by women occurs it is more likely to be in the form of self defense. (32, 37, 38).” This is selective citation because almost all studies that have compared men and women find about equal rates of self-defense. Perhaps even worse, none of the three studies cited provide evidence supporting the quoted sentence. Study #32 (Saunders 1986) shows that 31% of minor violence and 39% of severe was in self defense, i.e., about two-thirds of female perpetrated PV was not in self defense. Study #37 (DeKeseredy et al. 1997) found that only 7% of women said their violence was in self defense. Study #38 (Johnson and Ferraro 2000) is a review paper that has no original data. It cites #32 and #37, neither of which supports the claim.

Method 4. Conclude That Results Support Feminist Beliefs When They Do Not

The studies cited above, in addition to illustrating selective citation, there are also examples of the ability of ideological commitment to lead researchers to misinterpret the results of their own research. A study by Kernsmith (2005), for example, states that “Males and females were found to differ in their motivations for using violence in relationships and that “female violence may be more related to maintaining personal liberty in a relationship than gaining power” (p. 180). However, although Kernsmith’s Table 2 shows that women had higher scores on the “striking back” factor, only one question in this factor is about self defense.

The other questions in the factor are about being angry and coercing the partner. So, despite naming the factor as “striking back” it is mostly about anger and coercion. Therefore, the one significantly different factor shows that women more than men are motivated by anger at the partner and by efforts to coerce the partner. In addition, Kernsmith’s conclusion ignores the fact that the scores for men and women were approximately equal in respect to two of the three factors (“exerting power” and “disciplining partner”). Thus, Kernsmith’s study found the opposite of what was stated as the finding.

Method 5. Create Evidence by Citation

The Kernsmith study, the World Health Organization report, and the pattern of selective citation show how ideology can be converted into what can be called “evidence by citation” or what Gelles (1980) calls the “woozle effect.” A woozle effect occurs when frequent citation of previous publications that lack evidence mislead us into thinking there is evidence. For example, subsequent to the World Health Organization study and the Kernsmith study, papers discussing gender differences in motivation will cite them to show that female violence is predominantly in self-defence, which is the opposite of what the research actually shows. But because these are citations of an article in a scientific journal and a respected international organization, readers of the subsequent article will accept it as a fact. Thus, fiction is converted into scientific evidence that will be cited over and over. Another example is the claim that the Conflict Tactics Scales (Straus et al. 1996) does not provide an adequate measure of PV because it measures only conflict related violence.

Although the theoretical basis of the CTS is conflict theory, the introductory explanation to participants specifically asks participants to report expressive and malicious violence. It asks respondents about the times when they and their partner “[…]disagree, get annoyed with the other person, want different things from each other, or just have spats or fights because they are in a bad mood, are tired or for some other reason.” Despite repeating this criticism for 25 years in perhaps a hundred publications, none of those publications has provided empirical evidence showing that only conflict-related violence is reported. In fact, where there are both CTS data and qualitative data, as in Giles- Sims (1983), it shows that the CTS elicits malicious violence as well as conflict-related violence. Nevertheless, because there are at least a hundred articles with this statement in peer reviewed journals, it seems to establish as a scientific fact what is only an attempt to blame the messenger for the bad news about gender symmetry in PV.

Method 6. Obstruct Publication of Articles and Obstruct Funding Research That Might Contradict the Idea that Male Dominance Is the Cause of PV

I have documentation for only one case of publication being blocked, but I think this has often happened. The more frequent pattern is self-censorship by authors fearing that it will happen or that publication of such a study will undcrn1ine thcir reputation, and, in the case of graduate students, the ability to obtain a job.

An example of denying funding to research that might contradict the idea that PV is a male-only crime is the call for proposals to investigate partner violence issued in December 2005 by the National Institute of Justice. The announcement stated that proposals to investigate male victimization would not be eligible. Another example is the objection by a reviewer to a proposal a colleague and I submitted because of our “[…] naming violence in a relationships as a ‘human’ problem of aggression not a gender-based problem.” When priority scores by the reviewers are averaged, it takes only one extremely low score to place the proposal below the fundable level. Others have encountered similar blocks; for example Holtzworth-Munroe (2005). Eugen Lupri, a pioneer Canadian family violence researcher, has also documented examples of the resistance to funding and publishing research on female perpetrated violence (Lupri 2004).

Method 7. Harass, Threaten, and Penalize Researchers Who Produce Evidence That Contradicts Feminist Beliefs

Suzanne Steinmetz made the mistake of publishing a book and articles (Steinmetz 1977, 1977-1978) which clearly showed about equal rates of perpetration by males and females. Anger over this resulted in a bomb threat at her daughters’ wedding, and she was the object of a letter writing campaign to deny her promotion and tenure at the University of Delaware. Twenty years later the same processes resulted in a lecturer at the University of Manitoba whose dissertation found gender symmetry in PV being denied promotion and tenure. My own experiences have included having one of my graduate students being warned at a conference that she will never get a job if she does her PhD research with me. At the University of Massachusetts, I was prevented from speaking by shouts and stomping. The chairperson of the Canadian Commission on Violence against Women stated at two hearings held by the commission that nothing that Straus publishes can be believed because he is a wife-beater and sexually exploits students, according to a Toronto Magazine article. When I was elected President of the Society for the Study of Social Problems and rose to give the presidential address, a group of members occupying the first few rows of the room stood up and walked out.

Concluding Comments

The seven methods described above have created a climate of fear that has inhibited research and publication on gender symmetry in PV and largely explain why an ideology and treatment modality has persisted for 30 years, despite hundreds of studies which provide evidence on the multiplicity of risk factors for PV, of which patriarchy is only one. Because of space limitations and because I am a researcher not a service provider, I have not covered the even greater denial, dist0l1ion and coercion in prevention and treatment efforts. An example is the director of a battered women’s shelter who was tern1inated because she wanted to ask the residents whether they had hit their partner and the context in which that occurred. An example of governmental coercion of treatment is the legislation in a number of US states, and policies and funding restrictions in almost all US states that prohibit couple therapy for PV. Finally, it was painful for me as feminist to write this commentary.

I have done so for two reasons. First, I am also a scientist and, for this issue, my scientific commitments override my feminist commitments. Perhaps even more important, I believe that the safety and well-being of women requires efforts to end violence by women and the option to treat partner violence in some cases as a problem of psychopathology, or in the great majority of cases, as a family system problem (Straus and Scott, in press; Hamel and Nicholls 2006).

References

Black, D. (1983). Crime as social~control. American Sociological Review, 48(1), 34—45. DeKeseredy, W. S., Saunders, D. G., Schwartz, M. D., & Shahid, A. (1997). The meanings and motives for women’s use of violence in Canadian college dating relationships: Results from a National Survey. Sociological Spectrum, 17, 199-222.

Durose, M. R., Wolf Harlow, c.. Langan, P. A.• Motivans, M., Rantala. R. R., & Smith, E. L. (2005). Fami(v violence statistics inell/ding statistics on strangers alld acquaintances (No. NCJ 207846). Washington, DC.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office ofjustice Programs, Bureau of lustic Statistics.

Feld, S. L, & Straus, M. A. (1989). Escalation and desistance ofwife assault in marriage. Crimif101ogy, 27 (1),141-161.

Gelles, R. J. (1980). Violence in the family: A review of research in the seventies. Journal ofMarriage and the Fami(v, 42, 873-885.

GilesMSims, J. (1983). W{fe batlering: A :,~vstems theo’}’ approach. New York: Guilford Press. Hamel. 1., & Nicholls, T. (Eds.). (2006). Family approaches in domestic violence: A practitioner’s guide to

gender~inclusive research and treatment: Springer. Holtzworth-Munroe, A. (2005). Female perpetration of physical aggression against an intimate partner: A

controversial new topic of study. Violence and Victims, 20(2), 251~259. Johnson, H., & Sacco, V. F. (1995). Researching violence against women: Statistics canada’s national survey.

Canadian Journal 0.( Criminology, 281-304, July. Johnson, M. P., & Ferraro, K. J. (2000). Research on domestic violence in the 1990′s: Making distinctions.

JOl/rnal ofMarriage and the Fami(v, 62(4). 948-963. Johnson, M. P., & Leone, J. M. (2005). The differential effects of intimate terrorism and situational couple

violence – findings from the national violence against women survey. Journal OfFamily Issues, 26(3),

322-349. Kaufman Kantor, G., & Straus, M. A. (1987). The dnmken bum theory ofwife beating. Social pJ’oblems, 34,

213-230. Kennedy, L. W., & Dutton, D. G. (1989). The incidence of wife assault in alberta. Canadian JOl/mal of

Behavioral Science. 21( I). 40-54. Kemsmith, P. (2005). Exerting power or striking back: A gendered comparison of motivations for domestic

violence perpetration. Victims and Violence, 20(2), 173~I85. Krug, E. G., Dahlberg, L. L., Mercy. J. A., Zwi. A. B., Lozano, R., & World Health Organization. (2002).

World report 011 violence and health. Geneva: World Health Organization. Lackey, c., & Williams, K. R. (1995). Social bonding and the cessation of partner violence across

generations. Journal o f Marriage and the family, 57, 295~305. Lupri, E. (2004). Institutional resistance to acknowledging intimate male abuse, Counter-Roundtable

Conference on Domestic Violence. Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Medeiros, R. A, & Straus, M. A. (2006). Risk factors for physical violence between dating partners:

Implications for gender-inclusive prevention and treatment of family violence. In J. C. Hamel & T. Nicholls (Eds.), Family approaches to domestic violence: A practioners gUide to gender-inclusive research and treatment. Springer (also available at http://pubpages.unh.edu/-mas2).

Saunders, D. G. (1986). When battered women use violence: Husband-abuse or self~defense?Violence and Victims, 1(1),47-60.

Schulman, M. (1979). A survey of spoIlsal violence aqains! lvomen il/ Kentucky. Washington, DC: U.S. Govemment Printing Office.

Steinmetz, S. K. (1977). The cycle o f violence: Assertive, aggressive, and abusive fami(v illtaaction. New York: Praeger.

Steinmetz, S. K. (1977-1978). The battered husband syndrome. Victim%gy. 2, 499-509. Straus, M. A. (1999). The controversy over domestic violence by women: A methodological, theoretical, and sociology of science analysis. In X. Arriaga & S. Oskamp (Eds.), Violence in intimate

relationships (pp. 17..-44). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Straus, M. A., (2007) Dominance and synnnetry in partner violence by male and female University

Students in 32 nations, Children and YOUtl1 Services Re,iew , do; 10.lOl6/j.childyouth.2007.1O.004

Straus, M. A., & International Dating ViOlence Kcsearch ConsortIUm. (2004). Prevalence ot VIOlence against dating partners by male and female university students worldwide. Violence Against Women, 10(7), 790-811.

Straus, M. A., & Scott, K. (In press). Gender symmetry in partner violence: The evidence, the denial, and the implications for primary prevention and treatment. In J. R. Lutzker & D. J. Whitaker (Eds.), Prevention ofpartner violence. Washington D.C. : American Psychological Association.

Straus, M. A., Hamby, S. L., Boney-McCoy. S.• & Sugarman, D. B. (1996). The revised conflict tactics scales (CTS2): Development and preliminary psychometric data. Journal of Fami(v Issues, 17(3), 283-316.

Tjaden, P., & Thoennes, N. (2000). Full report (~(the prevalence, incidence, and consequences ofviolence against women: Findings fiv11I the national violence against women survey (No. NCJ 183781). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.

Written by Dr. Murray Straus

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Dr. Straus is a Professor of Sociology and founder and Co-Director of the Family Research Laboratory, University of New Hampshire. He earned the Award for Distinguished Lifetime Contributions to Research on Aggression, International Society For Research on Aggression, 2008

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Whole title | Regulations | Historical versions | Historical notes | Search title | PDF

Crimes Act 1900 No 40

Current version for 8 July 2011 to date (accessed 9 January 2012 at 14:08)

Part 7 Public justice offences

Division 1 Definitions

311   Definitions

(1)  In this Part:

benefit means any benefit or advantage whether or not in money or money’s worth.

judicial officer means a person who is, or who alone or with others constitutes, a judicial tribunal and includes a coroner.

judicial proceeding means a proceeding in or before a judicial tribunal in which evidence may be taken on oath.

judicial tribunal means a person (including a coroner and an arbitrator), court or body authorised by law, or by consent of parties, to conduct a hearing for the purpose of the determination of any matter or thing and includes a person, court or body authorised to conduct a committal proceeding.

public justice official means a person who is a public officer employed in any capacity (other than as a judicial officer) for the investigation, detection or prosecution of offenders.

(2)  In this Part, a reference to the making of a statement on oath includes a reference to the verification of a statement on oath.

312   Meaning of “pervert the course of justice”

A reference in this Part to perverting the course of justice is a reference to obstructing, preventing, perverting or defeating the course of justice or the administration of the law.

313   Knowledge that offence is a serious indictable offence is unnecessary

If it is an element of an offence under this Part that an offence is a serious indictable offence, it is not necessary for the prosecution to establish that the accused knew that the offence was a serious indictable offence.

Division 2 Interference with the administration of justice

314   False accusations etc

A person who makes an accusation intending a person to be the subject of an investigation of an offence, knowing that other person to be innocent of the offence, is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.

315   Hindering investigation etc

(1)  A person who does anything intending in any way to hinder:

(a)  the investigation of a serious indictable offence committed by another person, or

(b)  the discovery of evidence concerning a serious indictable offence committed by another person, or

(c)  the apprehension of another person who has committed a serious indictable offence,

is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.

(2)  For the purposes of subsection (1), a person is to be considered to have committed a serious indictable offence if a public officer engaged in the detection or investigation of offenders suspects on reasonable grounds that a person has committed the offence.

(3)  It is not an offence against this section merely to refuse or fail to divulge information or produce evidence.

315A   Threatening or intimidating victims or witnesses

(1)  A person who threatens to do or cause, or who does or causes, any injury or detriment to any other person intending to influence any person not to bring material information about an indictable offence to the attention of a police officer or other appropriate authority is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.

(2)  In this section:

material information means information that a person has that might be of material assistance in securing the apprehension of a person who has committed an indictable offence, or the prosecution or conviction of any such person.

316   Concealing serious indictable offence

(1)  If a person has committed a serious indictable offence and another person who knows or believes that the offence has been committed and that he or she has information which might be of material assistance in securing the apprehension of the offender or the prosecution or conviction of the offender for it fails without reasonable excuse to bring that information to the attention of a member of the Police Force or other appropriate authority, that other person is liable to imprisonment for 2 years.

(2)  A person who solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit for himself or herself or any other person in consideration for doing anything that would be an offence under subsection (1) is liable to imprisonment for 5 years.

(3)  It is not an offence against subsection (2) merely to solicit, accept or agree to accept the making good of loss or injury caused by an offence or the making of reasonable compensation for that loss or injury.

(4)  A prosecution for an offence against subsection (1) is not to be commenced against a person without the approval of the Attorney General if the knowledge or belief that an offence has been committed was formed or the information referred to in the subsection was obtained by the person in the course of practising or following a profession, calling or vocation prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this subsection.

(5)  The regulations may prescribe a profession, calling or vocation as referred to in subsection (4).

317   Tampering etc with evidence

A person who, with intent to mislead any judicial tribunal in any judicial proceeding:

(a)  suppresses, conceals, destroys, alters or falsifies anything knowing that it is or may be required as evidence in any judicial proceeding, or

(b)  fabricates false evidence (other than by perjury or suborning perjury), or

(c)  knowingly makes use of fabricated false evidence,

is liable to imprisonment for 10 years.

318   Making or using false official instrument to pervert the course of justice

(1)  In this section:

official instrument means an instrument of a kind that is made or issued by a person in his or her capacity as a public officer or by a judicial tribunal.

(2)  A person who makes a false official instrument, or who makes a copy of an instrument which the person knows to be a false official instrument, with the intention that:

(a)  he or she or another person will use it to induce another person to accept the instrument as genuine or to accept the copy as a copy of a genuine official instrument, and

(b)  that acceptance will pervert the course of justice,

is liable to imprisonment for 14 years.

(3)  A person who uses an instrument which the person knows to be a false official instrument, or who uses a copy of an instrument which the person knows to be a false official instrument, with the intention:

(a)  of inducing another person to accept the instrument as genuine or to accept the copy as a copy of a genuine official instrument, and

(b)  of thereby perverting the course of justice,

is liable to imprisonment for 14 years.

(4)  Section 250 applies to the interpretation of this section.

319   General offence of perverting the course of justice

A person who does any act, or makes any omission, intending in any way to pervert the course of justice, is liable to imprisonment for 14 years.

Division 3 Interference with judicial officers, witnesses, jurors etc

320   Extended meaning of “giving evidence”

In this Division, a reference to the giving of evidence includes a reference to the production of anything to be used as evidence.

321   Corruption of witnesses and jurors

(1)  A person who confers or procures or offers to confer or procure or attempt to procure any benefit on or for any person:

(a)  intending to influence any person called or to be called as a witness in any judicial proceeding to give false evidence or withhold true evidence or to not attend as a witness or not produce anything in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena, or

(b)  intending to influence any person (whether or not a particular person) in the person’s conduct as a juror in any judicial proceeding or to not attend as a juror in any judicial proceeding, whether he or she has been sworn as a juror or not, and intending to pervert the course of justice,

is liable to imprisonment for 10 years.

(2)  A person who solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit for himself or herself or any other person:

(a)  in consideration for any agreement or undertaking that any person will as a witness in any judicial proceeding give false evidence or withhold true evidence or not attend as a witness or not produce anything in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena, or

(b)  on account of anything to be done or omitted to be done by him or her or another person as a juror in any judicial proceeding, or on account of his or her or another person’s not attending as a juror in any judicial proceeding, intending to pervert the course of justice,

is liable to imprisonment for 10 years.

322   Threatening or intimidating judges, witnesses, jurors etc

A person who threatens to do or cause, or who does or causes, any injury or detriment to any person:

(a)  intending to influence a person called or to be called as a witness in any judicial proceeding to give false evidence or withhold true evidence or to not attend as a witness or not produce anything in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena, or

(b)  intending to influence any person (whether or not a particular person) in the person’s conduct as a juror in any judicial proceeding or to not attend as a juror in any judicial proceeding, whether he or she has been sworn as a juror or not, or

(c)  intending to influence any person in the person’s conduct as a judicial officer, or

(d)  intending to influence any person in the person’s conduct as a public justice official in or in connection with any judicial proceeding,

is liable to imprisonment for 10 years.

323   Influencing witnesses and jurors

A person who does any act:

(a)  intending to procure, persuade, induce or otherwise cause any person called or to be called as a witness in any judicial proceeding to give false evidence or withhold true evidence or to not attend as a witness or not produce any thing in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena, or

(b)  intending, other than by the production of evidence and argument in open court, to influence any person (whether or not a particular person) in the person’s conduct as a juror in any judicial proceeding, whether he or she has been sworn as a juror or not,

is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.

324   Increased penalty if serious indictable offence involved

A person who commits an offence against section 321, 322 or 323 (offences concerning interference with witnesses, jurors, judicial officers and public justice officials) intending to procure the conviction or acquittal of any person of any serious indictable offence is liable to imprisonment for 14 years.

325   Preventing, obstructing or dissuading witness or juror from attending etc

(1)  A person who without lawful excuse wilfully prevents, obstructs or dissuades a person called as a witness in any judicial proceeding from attending as a witness or from producing anything in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena is liable to imprisonment for 5 years.

(1A)  A person who without lawful excuse wilfully prevents, obstructs or dissuades another person who the person believes may be called as a witness in any judicial proceeding from attending the proceeding is liable to imprisonment for 5 years.

(2)  A person who without lawful excuse wilfully prevents, obstructs or dissuades a person summoned as a juror in any judicial proceeding from attending as a juror is liable to imprisonment for 5 years.

326   Reprisals against judges, witnesses, jurors etc

(1)  A person who threatens to do or cause, or who does or causes, any injury or detriment to any person on account of anything lawfully done by a person:

(a)  as a witness or juror in any judicial proceeding, or

(b)  as a judicial officer, or

(c)  as a public justice official in or in connection with any judicial proceeding,

is liable to imprisonment for 10 years.

(2)  A person who threatens to do or cause, or who does or causes, any injury or detriment to another person because the person believes the other person will or may be or may have been called as a witness, or will or may serve or may have served as a juror, in any judicial proceeding is liable to imprisonment for 10 years.

(3)  For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether the accused acted wholly or partly for a reason specified in subsection (1) or (2).

Division 4 Perjury, false statements etc

327   Offence of perjury

(1)  Any person who in or in connection with any judicial proceeding makes any false statement on oath concerning any matter which is material to the proceeding, knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to be true, is guilty of perjury and liable to imprisonment for 10 years.

(2)  A statement can be considered to have been made in connection with a judicial proceeding whether or not a judicial proceeding has commenced, or ever commences, in connection with it.

(3)  The determination of whether a statement is material to a judicial proceeding that has not commenced is to be made on the basis of any judicial proceeding likely to arise in connection with the statement.

(4)  The question of whether any matter is material to a proceeding is a question of law.

328   Perjury with intent to procure conviction or acquittal

Any person who commits perjury intending to procure the conviction or acquittal of any person of any serious indictable offence is liable to imprisonment for 14 years.

329   Conviction for false swearing on indictment for perjury

If on the trial of a person for perjury the jury is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of perjury but is satisfied on the evidence that the accused is guilty of an offence under section 330 (False statement on oath not amounting to perjury) it may find the accused not guilty of the offence charged but guilty of the latter offence and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly.

330   False statement on oath not amounting to perjury

A person who makes on oath any false statement knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to be true, if it is not perjury, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years.

331   Contradictory statements on oath

If on the trial of a person for perjury or for an offence under section 330 (False statement on oath not amounting to perjury):

(a)  the trier of fact is satisfied that the accused has made 2 statements on oath and one is irreconcilably in conflict with the other, and

(b)  the trier of fact is satisfied that one of the statements was made by the accused knowing it was false or not believing it was true but the trier of fact cannot say which statement was so made,

the trier of fact may make a special finding to that effect and find the accused guilty of perjury or of an offence under section 330, as appropriate, and the accused is liable to punishment accordingly.

332   Certain technical defects provided for

If on the trial of a person for perjury or for an offence under section 330 (False statement on oath not amounting to perjury):

(a)  any affidavit, deposition, examination or declaration offered in evidence is wrongly entitled or otherwise informal or defective, or

(b)  the jurat to any such instrument is informal or defective,

the accused is not entitled to an acquittal because of the omission, defect or informality but the instrument (if otherwise admissible) may be given in evidence and used for all purposes of the trial.

333   Subornation of perjury

(1)  A person who procures, persuades, induces or otherwise causes a person to give false testimony the giving of which is perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury and liable to imprisonment for 7 years.

(2)  A person who commits subornation of perjury intending to procure the conviction or acquittal of any person of any serious indictable offence is liable to imprisonment for 14 years.

334   General provisions applicable to perjury and false statement offences

It is immaterial for the purposes of this Division:

(a)  whether a statement on oath is given orally or in writing, or

(b)  which forms and ceremonies are used in administering the oath (or otherwise binding the person giving the testimony to speak the truth) so long as the person assents to the forms and ceremonies actually used, or

(c)  whether (in the case of a statement made in a judicial proceeding) the judicial tribunal concerned is properly constituted or held in the proper place or not, so long as it actually acts as a judicial tribunal in the proceeding in which the statement is made, or

(d)  whether the person who makes the statement is a competent witness or not, or whether the statement is admissible in the proceeding or not, or

(e)  in the case of judicial proceedings in an arbitration, whether the law governing the arbitration agreement or the proceedings, or any other relevant law, is or is not the law ofNew South Wales.

335   False statements in evidence on commission

If a person, in giving any testimony (either orally or in writing) otherwise than on oath, when required to do so by an order under section 33 (Power of the Supreme Court to give effect to application for assistance) of the Evidence on Commission Act 1995, makes any statement that is false in a material particular, knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to be true, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years.

336   False entry on public register

(1)  A person who for an improper purpose makes a statement for the making of an entry in any register kept by a public officer for a public purpose, knowing the statement to be false or misleading in a material particular, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years.

(2)  A person who for an improper purpose makes an entry in any register kept by a public officer for a public purpose, knowing the entry to be false or misleading in a material particular, is liable to imprisonment for 5 years.

337   False instruments issued by public officers

A public officer who, being authorised or required to issue an instrument whereby any person may be prejudicially affected, issues the instrument for an improper purpose knowing it to be false in a material particular is liable to imprisonment for 5 years.

338   Restrictions on prosecutions for perjury

(1)  A person is not to be prosecuted for perjury except:

(a)  by the Director of Public Prosecutions, or

(b)  at the direction of the Attorney General, or

(c)  by any other person with leave of the judicial officer who constituted the judicial tribunal before which the perjury is alleged to have been committed.

(2)  If it is impossible or impracticable to apply for leave to prosecute in accordance with subsection (1) (c), the prosecution may be instituted with leave of the Supreme Court.

(3)  A person is not to be prosecuted for perjury (except by the Director of Public Prosecutions or at the direction of the Attorney General) unless notice of the proposed prosecution has been given to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

339   Application of Division to perjury under other Acts

Any false oath declared by any Act to be perjury or made punishable as perjury by any Act is to be considered to be perjury for the purposes of this Act.

Division 5 Miscellaneous

340   Extent of abolition of offences

The offences at common law abolished by this Division are abolished for all purposes not relating to offences committed before the commencement of this Part (as substituted by the Crimes (Public Justice) Amendment Act 1990).

341   Certain common law offences abolished

The following offences at common law are abolished:

•  the offence of perverting the course of justice,

•  the offence of attempting or conspiring to pervert the course of justice,

•  the offence of falsely accusing a person of a crime or of procuring a person to falsely accuse a person of a crime,

•  the offence of concealing evidence so that a person is falsely accused of a crime,

•  the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice by assisting a person to avoid arrest,

•  the offence of persuading a person to make a false statement to police to mislead them in their investigation,

•  the offence of procuring a person to make a false accusation,

•  the offence of misprision of felony,

•  the offence of compounding a felony,

•  the offence of dissuading, intimidating or preventing, or attempting to dissuade, intimidate or prevent, a person who is bound to give evidence in a criminal matter from doing so,

•  the offence of using threats or persuasion to witnesses to induce them not to appear or give evidence in courts of justice,

•  the offence of perjury,

•  the offence of embracery (attempting to corrupt, influence or instruct a jury or to induce a jury to favour one side more than the other),

•  personating a juror.

342   Certain conspiracy offences not affected

The abolition of the common law offence of conspiring to pervert the course of justice does not prevent a prosecution for an offence of conspiring to commit an offence against this Part.

343   Certain common law offences not abolished

To remove any doubt, it is declared that the following offences at common law are not abolished by this Division:

(a)  the offence of escaping from lawful custody,

(b)  the offence of assisting a person to escape from lawful custody,

(c)  the offence of refusing to assist a peace officer in the execution of his or her duty in preventing a breach of the peace.

343A   Saving of other punishments

Nothing in this Part prevents or affects any other punishment, or any forfeiture, provided under any Act.

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InAustralia.

All folks should know from the outset that (a) constitutionally family matters except only ‘formal’ marriage {Marriages Act Commonwealth} are States and Territories jurisdiction – not Federal (b) there has never been a referendum to allow cross vesting into the Family Court of Australia from States and Territories (c) a hearing in the Family Court of Australia is one of free ‘choice’ or ‘trickery’.  You can take your family matter to the States Family Matters Court and if they refuse then go to the High Court for a ‘cause to show why’ or writ of mandamus for an order that the state court hears your matter.  States only legislated that you ‘may’ go to the Family Court of Australia if you wish.

Also there is no constitutional or legal or other reason why women should not be treated as equally as men in all matters including family violence as feminists have so long sought. It is about ‘citizen’ equality that encompasses gender or race or religious equality and it should not be any different when it comes to women committing crimes that they are treated equally in punishments. Now where have all of the feminist disappeared to? Hypocrites they are only interested in their perpetual gender war against men.  Mainly out of Government Service Deliveries including police and courts who fail their impartiality duties to favour women over men thereby converting one law into two unlawfully.  And blokes into second class citizens.

The variation to ‘law’ occurs in Government Administration ‘processing’ and not in The Legislature.  Folks must take most actions under ‘administrative law’ to recover our democracy from this ‘insurgents’ clutches. Take my advice of almost two decades campaigning for the equality of fathers and men as it is supposed to be out of The Legislature.  They are the hardest nosed bitches ever one will meet as I do meet frequently ‘holding out’ in their Government paid jobs unlawfully ‘for women’.

In most of these cases and comments quoted on this site there are glaring cases of perjury and ‘abuse of office’ and ‘mandamus’ etc under ADMINISTRAITIVE LAW just waiting to be prosecuted in parallel or post to fathers losing their cases in these ‘unlawful’ ways.  But it will not be until blokes get some guts and take on these lawbreakers outside of their own narrow minded case that there will be any ‘restoration’ of our democracy.  It will be when the ‘staff’ are made to also comply with the ‘administrative’ law as it applies to how they come to ‘determinations’.

Our court are ‘adversarial’ get supplied lies and thus decide on lies unless you pursue perjury.  Take your minds to ‘how’ officers do their jobs and prosecute them when they do not comply with their ‘due process’ duties.  Administrative law is just as much available as family law or child support etc so use it for your protection being for what it was devised.

The amendments to the Family Law Act do not make false reports or perjury lawful it only removes the ‘penalties’ which might be unconstitutional as perjury is a crime as much against The Commonwealth and Federal Court as it is against Family Members and Citizens alike.  It needs a constitutional challenge.  Protem it can be ignored for other reasons.

Perjury remains as prosecutable as ever and should not be ignored.  Step out of your current or past case and file an application for the perjury to be heard.  From a success there you can then because of its ‘unlawfulness’ get a retrial with the perjury struck out and get a win where there was because of perjury a loss.  However be clearly advised if you the ‘aggrieved’ party do not pursue a case of perjury – it is your legal responsibility – it then is you who by default makes it legal – as it always has been since before these latest amendments.  Fathers do themselves in by not prosecuting obvious perjury.

Robert E Kennedy Coordinator – NT Office Status of Family    ph 08 8932 3339